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Abstract
Universal composability is a framework for the specification
and analysis of cryptographic protocols with a strong com-
positionality guarantee: UC protocols remain secure even
when composed with other protocols. Secure compilation
studies whether compiled programs are as secure as their
source-level counterparts, no matter what target-level code
they interact with. Although at present these disciplines are
studied in isolation, we argue that there is a deep connection
between them whose exploration will benefit both.
This paper outlines the connection between universal com-
posability and robust compilation, the latest of secure com-
pilation theories. We show how to read the universal com-
posability theorem in terms of a robust compilation theo-
rem, and vice-versa. This, in turn, shows which element of
one theory corresponds to which element in the other. We
believe this is the first step towards understanding how se-
cure compilation theories can be used in universal compos-
ability settings, and vice-versa.
To better explain and clarify notions, this paper uses colours.
For a better experience, please print or view this paper in colour.
1 Introduction
Universal composability (UC) is a framework for the speci-
fication and analysis of cryptographic protocols with a key
guarantee about compositionality [6, 7]. Several variations
of UC exist [4, 11, 14, 17] but in this paper we focus on the
originalmodel of Canetti [6]. If a protocol is provenUC, that
protocol behaves analogously to some high-level, secure-by-
construction ideal functionality nomatter what the protocol
interacts with. As such, if that protocol is used within a
larger protocol, in order to reason about the latter, we can
replace the former protocol with its ideal functionality and
just reason about the rest. In other words, UC protocols are
secure even when composed with other protocols.
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Secure compilation (SC) is a discipline that studies how
to prove that a compiler from a source to a target language
preserves the security properties of source programs in the
target programs it produces. Several criteria for secure com-
pilation have been proposed in the literature, ranging from
relational, equivalence-based notions [1, 21] to more recent
notions based on preserving traces [2, 19, 20].
While these two worlds seem to deal with quite differ-
ent notions, we argue that they are deeply connected: both
worlds are concerned with abstract notions (ideal function-
alities, source programs) which are generally deemed se-
cure, andmore concrete notions (protocols, target programs)
whose security must be proven against arbitrary opponents.
What’s more, proving that a protocol is UC, or that a com-
piler is secure, ensures that any attack at the concrete level
(attacker, target program context) can be simulated at the
abstract level (simulator, source program context).
We dig deeper into this analogy and show that there are
benefits to be gained for both worlds by understanding their
correspondence more deeply. After presenting UC and SC,
this paper briefly outlines those benefits.
1.1 Universal Composability
We begin by briefly sketching how the UC framework is
used. First, cryptographers craft a concrete cryptographic
protocol Π of interest, for example, a key-agreement and
message transmission protocol like TLS [10]. In order to
prove that Π is UC (Π ⊢UC F), they must come up with an
ideal functionality F that (a) is secure by construction—in
this example, a secret channel—and (b) such thatΠ is at least
as secure as F. What is key here is that the behaviour ofΠ is
given with respect to malicious attackers A that try to vio-
late the cryptographic guarantees ofΠ. The ideal functional-
ity, on the other hand, exists in a secure world where it inter-
acts with “safe” attackers S that cannot break the ideal func-
tionality. Roughly speaking, a UC proof demonstrates that
it is possible to reduce any A to some S, effectively show-
ing that any possible adversarial behaviour against Π in the
real world is also possible against F in the secure world. Be-
cause the secure world is secure by construction, the proto-
col must be secure in the real world.
The behaviour of protocols, ideal functionalities and at-
tackers is observed by an environment Z that outputs a boolean
value 0/1 representing some abstract observation. Intuitively,
if Z’s output is the same in both worlds, its observations of
(Π, A) and (F, S) match. However, since protocols deal with
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elements such as keys, which are guessable finite bitstrings,
allowing all possible attackers would break any scheme. To
sidestep this issue, Z’s outputs in the twoworldsmust be the
same except with very small probability (≈), and attackers
must be polynomially bounded.
We can formalise UC as follows [6].
Definition1.1 (UC (Informally)). Π ⊢UC F
def
=∀A,∃S,∀Z such
that A is poly-bound. Then the diagram holds.
Π A
Z
0/1
F S
Z
0/1
≈
Bidirectional arrows (↔) represent the ability to communi-
cate between two parties. ⊟
A key result of UC is that we can reason about protocols
compositionally. Thus, ifΠ1 ⊢UC F1 and we also have a larger
protocolΠbig that usesΠ1 inside (Πbig [Π1]), thenwe can just
reason about the larger protocol using the ideal functional-
ity instead (Πbig [F1]). This simplifies the reasoning process:
the Π1 sub-part is secure, since it behaves like F1.
1.2 Robust Compilation
Recent developments in secure compilation have created a
set of criteria that preserve classes of hyperproperties (read,
arbitrary program behaviours [8]) dubbed robust compila-
tion [2]. These criteria (like previous secure compilation cri-
teria [1, 5, 19, 21]) are robust, i.e., they talk about arbitrary
target-level attackers that compiled code is linked against.
Our candidate from the robust compilation set is Robust
Hyperproperty-Preserving Compilation (RHC), whose for-
mal definition is given below. A compiler satisfying RHC
produces compiled code that upholds the same hyperprop-
erties as its source-level counterpart. Informally, a compiler
satisfies RHC if, no matter what target-level program con-
text (∀A) the compiled code (JPK) is linked against (⊲⊳)1 the
target behaviour ( t) can also be reproduced ( t) by the
source program (P) linked with (⊲⊳) a source-level program
context (∃A). Formally, RHC is defined as follows:
Definition 1.2 (RHC). J·K ⊢ RHC
def
= ∀P,A. ∃A. ∀t.
A ⊲⊳ JPK t ⇐⇒ A ⊲⊳ P t ⊟
To make the connection with UC clearer, below is a dia-
grammatic representation of RHC. We invite the reader to
compare it with the UC diagram presented before.
AJPK ⊲⊳
t
 
AP ⊲⊳
t
 
⇐⇒
1 Wedonot use themore conventional programming-language notation for
plugging a program in a context, namely A [P], to draw a neater analogy
with UC. Effectively, these two notations are equivalent: A [P] and A ⊲⊳ P .
1.3 A Bridge Between Two Worlds
At this point, we start to see a connection between the two
worlds: it looks like all elements from each system exist in
the other. We capture this intuition in the table below.
UC SC
protocol Π JPK compiled program
concrete attacker A A target context
ideal functionality F P source program
simulator S A source context
environment, output Z, 0/1 t , trace, semantics
communication ↔ ⊲⊳ linking
probabilistic equiv. ≈ ⇐⇒ trace equality
human translation Π → F J·K: P → P compiler
While most of this table should, at this point, not be surpris-
ing, we want to focus on the final line, since our primary
insights revolve around it.
While decades of work has yielded automated tools to
generate binaries for our computers in the form of compil-
ers, the same is far from true for cryptographic protocols—
and devising ideal functionalities for complex cryptographic
protocols by hand is a tedious and error-prone process. But
the above analogy suggests that secure compilation may
point the way towards generating concrete cryptographic
protocols from high-level specifications, much like binaries
are created from high-level programming languages. This
would have a plethora of benefits, a few of which we list be-
low. First, secure compilation for cryptography would open
the development of new cryptographic protocols to a broad
audience. Second, having compilers for cryptographic pro-
tocols would let us draw upon years of knowledge in proof
mechanisation, both to mechanise UC proofs and to auto-
mate the secure implementation of cryptographic protocols
(along the lines of CompCert [16] and CakeML [13]).
Finally, UC proofs are often very complex, and that com-
plexity is in fact a major hurdle for widespread adoption of
the framework. For example, it took years and several un-
successful attempts to prove results for cryptographic prim-
itives as seemingly basic as digital signatures [3] and sym-
metric encryption [15] (a particular challenge is the defini-
tion of polynomial runtime bounds [12]). Fortunately, re-
cent advances in proving compilers secure have given us
well-understood proof techniques called backtranslations [2,
9, 18, 20]—andwe believe these techniques can be employed
to rigorously and automatically generate UC proofs.
On the other side, reasoning about composition for securely-
compiled programs may lead to new insights for SC. Con-
sider some securely-compiled code JP1KA linked with other
securely compiled code JP2KB . What this entails at the level
of the resulting program JP1KA ⊲⊳ JP2KB is unknown, because
each compiled program may be proven secure in the sense
of preserving a distinct class of hyperproperties. We believe
that insights from the UC world will help us reason about
securely-compiled program composition.
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